Analysis of the geopolitical components influencing the convergence between Iran and Germany during the first Pahlavi era (1933–1941)

Expansion of economic and political relations between Reza Shah’s government and Germany during the Nazi era (1934–1941) was one of the key issues in the foreign policy of the Pahlavi regime. With the rise of the Nazi Party in Germany, the country’s liberation from the adverse consequences of World War I and the weakening of the obligations imposed by the Treaty of Versailles were perceived to be contingent upon emphasizing the expansion of Germany’s geopolitical influence in strategically significant regions of the world. In this context, economic and political relations between Iran and Nazi Germany increased progressively during this period. Numerous studies have thus far been conducted on the causes of this convergence; however, these studies have rarely addressed the geopolitical imperatives of this convergence arising from the interplay of geo-economic and geo-cultural factors, as well as the strategic considerations related to the geostrategic positioning of Iran and Nazi Germany about one another. This study seeks to examine the causes of the convergence between Reza Shah’s regime and Nazi Germany within the framework of classical geopolitics, relying on historical documentation and the presentation of deductive arguments. The study's findings indicate that one of the reasons for this convergence was rooted in Germany’s geo-economic interests in securing access to raw materials for its industries and consumer markets beyond Europe. Iran, in turn, utilized this convergence to escape its geostrategic position as a buffer zone between the British and Soviet empires. Moreover, to reinforce this convergence, emphasis on shared cultural elements between Iran and Germany, particularly their perceived common Aryan heritage, was transformed into a geo-cultural construct and actively promoted by both governments.